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The significant growth of banking frauds, fueled by the underground economy of malware, raised the need
for effective detection systems. Therefore, in last the years, banks have upgraded their security to protect
transactions from frauds. State-of-the-art solutions detect frauds as deviations from customers’ spending
habits. To the best of our knowledge, almost all existing approaches do not provide an in-depth model’s
granularity and security analysis against elusive attacks.
In this paper, we examine Banksealer, a decision support system for banking fraud analysis, evaluating
the influence on the detection performance of the granularity at which the spending habits are modeled and
its security against evasive attacks. First, we compare user-centric modeling, which builds a model for each
user, with system-centric modeling, which builds a model for the entire system, from the point of view of
the detection performance. Then, we assess the robustness of Banksealer against malicious attackers that are
aware of the structure of the models in use. To this end, we design and implement a proof-of-concept attack
tool that performs mimicry attacks, emulating a sophisticated attacker that cloaks frauds to avoid detection.
We experimentally confirm the feasibility of such attacks, their cost and the effort required to an attacker in
order to perform them. In addition, we discuss possible countermeasures.
We provide a comprehensive evaluation on a large, real-world dataset obtained from one of the largest
Italian banks.
CCSConcepts: • Information systems→Online banking; • Security andprivacy→ Intrusion/anomaly
detection and malware mitigation; • Computing methodologies→ Machine learning;
Additional KeyWords and Phrases: Online banking, fraud and anomaly detection, spending pattern granularity
analysis, mimicry attack;
ACM Reference Format:
Michele Carminati, Mario Polino, Andrea Continella, Andrea Lanzi, Federico Maggi, and Stefano Zanero. 2018.
Security Evaluation of a Banking Fraud Analysis System. ACM Trans. Priv. Sec. 21, 3 (June 2018), 30 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3178370
This work has received funding from the European Union H2020 Programme, under grant agreement 700326 “RAMSES,” as
well as from projects co-funded by the Lombardy region and Secure Network S.r.l.
Authors’ addresses: Michele Carminati, Politecnico di Milano, michele.carminati@polimi.it; Mario Polino, Politecnico di
Milano, mario.polino@polimi.it; Andrea Continella, Politecnico di Milano, andrea.continella@polimi.it; Andrea Lanzi,
Università degli studi di Milano, andrea.lanzi@unimi.it; Federico Maggi, Politecnico di Milano, Trend Micro Inc. Federico_
Maggi@trendmicro.com; Stefano Zanero, Politecnico di Milano, stefano.zanero@polimi.it.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee
provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and
the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored.
Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires
prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.
2471-2566/2018/6-ART $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3178370
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Article . Publication date: June 2018.
:2 M. Carminati et al.
1 INTRODUCTION
The popularity of Internet banking has led to an increase of frauds, perpetrated through cyber-
attacks, phishing scams and malware campaigns, resulting in substantial financial losses [5, 48].
Financial malware seems to be evolving through the collaboration between malware creators,
growing by 16% since Q1 2016 [14]. In 2016 financial malware infected about 2,8 million personal
devices, a 40% increase since 2015 [1].
This raised the need for effective fraud analysis systems able to detect frauds with a low False
Positive (FP) rate. What makes banking fraud detection extremely challenging is the inherently
dynamic behavior that characterizes them. One of the main challenges to address is being able to
spot frauds spread across different customer profiles, and dispersed in large datasets. An additional
challenge is creating systems that are adaptive both to changing customer behavior and to the
cultural and behavioral differences in different regions of the world.
Commercial systems do exist, but they offer limited insight in their inner workings due to obvious
intellectual property concerns. Academic research on the subject, on the other hand, is severely
limited because of the limited availability of datasets of transactions and frauds (due to obvious
privacy concerns).
To the best of our knowledge, state-of-the-art solutions detect frauds as deviations from the
spending habits of bank customers and build black-box models that are not very insightful for ana-
lysts in the subsequent manual investigations, making the process less efficient. More importantly,
as far as we know, almost none of them provides an accurate analysis of model’s granularity and
an in-depth security analysis against evasive attacks (i.e., mimicry attack).
With Banksealer [10, 11] we introduced an effective online banking decision and fraud analysis
system. In particular, Banksealer automatically ranks frauds and anomalies in wire transfer, prepaid
phone, and debit cards transactions. During a training phase, it builds a local, global, and temporal
profile for each user. The local profile models past user behavior to evaluate the anomaly of new
transactions. The global profile clusters users according to their transactions features. The temporal
profile aims to model transactions in terms of time-dependent attributes. Banksealer also handles
the undertraining of user profiles.
While the experiments presented in [11] showed the effectiveness of Banksealer, two important
points were left open for research at the time. First, the approach described in the original paper
was based on a user-centric profiling, and did not consider a system-centric approach, where the
detection model characterizes the general interactions between “users” and the bank. This approach
has been broadly used for behavioral malware detection [13, 25]. Second, a security analysis of the
detection model against a motivated and advanced adversary was needed in order to validate the
robustness of the system.
For these reasons, in this paper we aim to (1) provide an analysis of the influence of model’s
granularity on Banksealer by comparing the performance of the user-centric approach against
the system-centric approach and (2) to perform an in-depth security analysis of Banksealer by
measuring its effectiveness against evasive attacks in terms of detection performance. We first
redesign Banksealer with a system-centric approach (see Section 5). We then compare the original
approach with the redesigned one, using real-world banking transactions data. Thanks to the
collaboration with an important Italian bank and leveraging the domain expert’s knowledge, we
reproduced frauds (in a controlled environment) performed against banking users, and recorded
the resulting fraudulent transactions. As a result, we can experimentally confirm that a user-centric
modeling outperforms a system-centric one in terms of detection rate, while the latter has less
computational requirements and is more generic (see Section 7.3.1). We then analyze the security
of Banksealer against an attacker who is equipped with knowledge about its inner workings. We
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implement a proof-of-concept mimicry attack, allowing the adversary to try to cloak frauds and
evade the detection. We find that this attack is effective, hiding a considerable amount of fraudulent
transactions. Still, we show that Banksealer mitigates mimicry attack and correctly detects such
frauds with up to 80% detection rate and a false positive rate lower than 10% (see Section 7.4).
This paper extends [11] with original concepts, discussions and new results. In summary, we
make the following novel contributions respect the previous work:
• We extend and complement the original Banksealer paper by comparing its effectiveness
against a system-centric approach.
• We assess the robustness of Banksealer against a mimicry attack in which an attacker,
equipped with knowledge of the system, tries to perform frauds that mimic legitimate
transactions.
• We provide a comprehensive evaluation of the above aspects by using an anonymized,
real-world dataset of banking transactions.
1.1 Document Organization
The reader interested in a high-level introduction on Internet banking frauds should start from
Section 2, which provides the background terminology and concepts, along with a general overview
of typical fraud schemes. We highlight the importance of model granularity and the feasibility of
attacks that weaken the detection capabilities of a system such as ours.
In Section 3 we review the state of the art of research on fraud detection. We focus on prac-
tical approaches and mechanisms that can be applied in real scenarios and that recognize the
consequences, or post-conditions, of a fraud. This includes techniques to find anomalous financial
transactions in a bank account. In addition, we review the literature related to mimicry attacks.
Section 4 provides a detailed summary of our previous work in the field [11]. We refer the
interested reader to the original paper for further details, although we provide enough information
to understand the contributions of this work.
In Section 5 we evaluate, from the theoretical point of view, the influence of the granularity at
which the spending habits are modeled. We compare the user-centric modeling, used in [11], with
a system-centric one. We discuss their respective advantages and disadvantages.
In Section 6 we introduce the definition of mimicry attacks applied to fraud analysis systems. We
present the design and the implementation of an attack tool which allows a sophisticated attacker
to cloak frauds to avoid detection.
In Section 7 we provide a comprehensive evaluation of Banksealer. First, we compare user-centric
and system-centric modeling from the point of the detection performance. Then, we present the
results of the security analysis of Banksealer against the mimicry attack.
In Section 8 we discuss the limitations of our work and the impact of the security and granularity
analysis.
Finally, Section 9 provides conclusions and key aspects of the evaluation of Banksealer from the
point of view of modeling granularity and the security against expert attacks.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION
Banking services are heavily targeted by cyber criminals. A compromised banking account can be
used to directly steal funds from the available balance, or can be sold on the underground market 1.
Moreover, fraudsters constantly improve their techniques to contrast online banking defenses. For
this reason, fraudulent behavior is dynamic, rare, and dispersed in very large and highly imbalanced
1https://blog.kaspersky.com/hacking-value/2161/
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Fig. 1. Typical Fraud Scheme: MitB and MitMo attacks.
datasets. In addition, customer habits change over the time making more difficult to distinguish
fraudulent transactions from normal ones.
2.1 Banking Fraud Scenario
In this paper, we use the broad term attack to refer to any attempt to commit a fraud against an
unaware user. During the years several threats have emerged against banking services. Besides the
traditional ones, such as Password Database Theft, which aims at stealing users’ credential from a
web service to re-use them to hack other website’s accounts, or Phishing, which aims to acquire
sensitive information by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication, the
main threat is represented by banking Trojan or “infostealers”. This malware leverages Man-in-the-
Browser (MitB) techniques to intercept and modify web pages, as well as transaction content, at the
level of the rendering engine of the browser, in a way undetectable by the user and host application.
Endpoint solutions offer little protection because are hard to deploy uniformly, due to the variety
of devices (e.g., phone, tablet, desktop). Also, modern banking Trojan are often able to bypass the
second factor authentication, if present, by infecting the mobile device (Man-in-the-Mobile (MitMo)
attack) and stealing the OTPs sent via text messages, or by deceiving the user into entering the
OTP when needed, or by stealing the complete set of OTPs (e.g., grid card). Therefore, effective
fraud-detection solutions to identify fraudulent transfers are still a much-needed product.
In Figure 1 we show the typical scheme of a fraud in which a banking Trojan infects the victim’s
PC and mobile device and has the capabilities of executing multiple transactions (MitB and MitMo
attacks), while remaining undetected.
2.2 Fraud Analysis and Detection Systems
To contrast fraudulent cyber-attacks banks developed fraud analysis and detection systems that aim
at identifying unauthorized activities as quickly as possible once they have been carried out. These
systems monitor and scrutinize banking transactions, comparing their patterns with transactions
history and scoring suspicious transactions on-the-fly for analyst’s verification. Since all analysis
needs a time-consuming manual investigation, the number of high ranked transactions should be
kept at a manageable level (i.e. the systems must have a low false positive rate).
Fraud analysis and detection systems must evolve because criminals will adapt their strategies in
order to circumvent them. Despite the importance of the problem, the development of new banking
fraud detection and analysis methods is made difficult by the limited availability of transaction and
fraud datasets, due to privacy concerns. As a consequence, only a limited amount of papers deals
with this problem. Existent solutions detect frauds as deviations from the spending habits of bank
customers. Commercial systems do exist, but they offer limited insight in their inner workings due
to obvious intellectual property concerns.
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2.3 Research Goal
Our previous work, Banksealer [11], tried to overcome the limitations of state-of-the-art solutions.
First, it has been developed and evaluated on a real-word dataset of Internet banking transactions.
A major difference between existing approaches is that they do not give the analyst a motivation for
the analysis results, making manual investigation and confirmation more difficult. On the contrary,
Banksealer supports analysts by ranking new transactions that deviate from the learned profiles,
with an output that has an easily understandable and immediate statistical meaning. In other words,
it helps the analyst in understanding the reasons behind fraud alerts.
While the experiments presented in [11] showed that Banksealer is an effective approach in
identifying bank frauds, several important points were not addressed. First, the approach described
in the original paper based its own detection on the profiling of users and it did not take into con-
sideration an analysis of the detection performances varying the granularity at which transactions
are modeled. A system-centric approach, where the detection model characterizes the general
interactions between users and the bank operations, must be considered. Second, a deeper security
analysis of the detection model need to be considered in order to validate the robustness of the
system attacks.
Therefore, the focus of this work is to overcome these limitations, evaluating the influence on
the detection quality of the granularity at which the spending habits are modeled and its security
against sophisticated attacker that cloaks frauds to avoid detection.
3 RELATEDWORKS
Fraud analysis and detection, mainly focused on credit card fraud, is a wide research topic, for
which we refer the reader to [5, 12, 32] that present a comprehensive survey of data mining-based
fraud detection research.
From the supervised point of view,[2] proposed an offline rule-based Internet banking fraud
detection system based on key-features, extracted from data analysis, necessary, for the authors, to
detect frauds. The proposed technique cannot work in real time and thus is profoundly different
from Banksealer.
FraudMiner [38] proposed a credit card fraud detection model for detecting fraud from highly
imbalanced and anonymous credit card transaction datasets. The class imbalance problem is handled
by finding legal as well as fraud transaction patterns for each customer by using frequent itemset
mining. A matching algorithm based on Apriori frequent itemset mining is also proposed to find to
which pattern (legal or fraud) the incoming transaction of a particular customer is closer, and a
decision is made accordingly. However, the proposed technique does not consider users that have
only one transaction: these users are removed, and the dataset is reduced to a half. This is a very
strong limitation, because undertrained users are common and important too in the fraud detection
domain. On the contrary, our approach handles the problem of dealing with the scarcity of data
that might not be enough to train an anomaly detection system in a reasonable time frame.
Other two supervised approaches are [44], and [3]. The first proposes a dynamic model which
is updated with a sliding window approach. A model is trained each day and it is used to classify
transactions of the next day. For each transaction, it computes aggregate attributes (e.g., average
amount, number of transactions) and network attributes based on relationships between credit card
holders and merchants. The second applies two approaches for fraud detection: neural network
committee, which is an ensemble of neural networks with different topologies, and clustering.
Clustering is used to produce training sets that are given in input to the neural network committee.
All attributes are converted into binary variables (e.g., attributes that represent real values are
split into intervals while binary variables represent the membership to each interval). The main
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limitation of these two works is that they depend on supervised information, which are not always
available, to build the fraudulent model. Unlike Banksealer, they are not very insightful for analysts
in the subsequent manual investigations, making the process less efficient. Furthermore, we believe
that a general problem of supervised detection approaches is that usually adopt static supervised
models of fraudulent behavior, which cannot be automatically updated, but always require a manual
intervention (i.e., addition of a rule, a label). Consequently, these systems usually have a high false
positive rate when a new fraud pattern emerge.
From the unsupervised point of view, [29, 41] proposed a detection mechanism to identify
illegitimate users and trace their unlawful activities using Hidden Markov Model (HMM). HMM
is a very powerful model when it works on temporal classification problems and on a large
training dataset. In other cases when the training dataset is not large enough it can easily miss-
classified data and produce high false positive rate [34]. Our approach, instead, uses semi-supervised
learning model that lies between supervised and unsupervised learning. In addition to unlabeled
data, the algorithm is provided with some supervision information – but not necessarily for all
examples. In our case, the supervised information was the absence of fraud in the training dataset.
Moroever semi-supervised learning also support a computational model for understanding human
category learning, where most of the input is self-evidently unlabelled [49]. In addition, unlikely
our approach, they are not designed on real data. Real transaction data, has many peculiarities
(e.g., skewed attribute distribution) that have huge implications for the typical statistical and data
mining methods used in the outlier detection field.
The approach presented in [48] is interesting as it combines various algorithms by considering the
dependence between events at different points in time, to produce an overall risk score. In particular,
it differentiates fraudulent behavior from genuine behavior trying to overcome contrast pattern
mining shortcomings. In practice, it introduces a hybrid model, combining decision forests, cost-
sensitive artificial neural networks and a classifier based on Emerging Patterns to increase its statistic
modeling capability and to reduce the number of “false” rejections. Another interesting aspect is
represented by the dataset description and feature extraction, which confirms the peculiarity of our
dataset and the assumptions made in our previous work [11]. However, this approach deals with
the logs of the online banking web application, and thus is profoundly different from Banksealer
since it does not detect frauds as much as irregular interactions with the bank application.
[45] presents an analyst-in-the-loop security system, where analyst intuition is put together
with state-of-the-art machine learning to build an end-to-end active learning system. The system
has four key features: a big data behavioral analytics platform, an ensemble of outlier detection
methods, a mechanism to obtain feedback from security analysts, and a supervised learning module.
In particular, their platform integrates outlier detection methods based on Principal Component
Analysis [39], neural networks ([20, 36, 37] and statistical models. The previous method, and in
general neural network approaches [16, 26, 31] and decision tree techniques [35, 40] present several
disadvantages in the fraud detection context. For example, they have poor explanation capability,
are less efficient in processing large data sets and difficult to setup and operate. In addition, they
are so sensitive to data format and data representations (i.e., a large number of parameters) that
can produce different results. In general, these types of approaches build black box models that are
not very insightful for analysts in the subsequent manual investigations, making the process less
efficient.
A recurrent concept in many fraud detection works is the granularity at which the detection
is performed.
[23] is based on an unsupervised modeling of local and global observations of users’ behavior, and
relies on differential analysis to detect frauds as deviations from “normal” behavior. This evidence is
strengthened or weakened by the users’ global behavior. In particular, from the local point of view,
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the proposed approach compares a buffer of current session transactions, “current profile”, with
recent transactions, “mean profile”, through statistical methods. By doing this, the system monitors
the payment frequency, number of failed, and successful logins. The global analysis instead, requires
a software directly installed on client devices to login to the online banking portal. This software
provides a device identification and associates devices with user’ account. The proposed system
exploits the global profile to strengthen fraud hypothesis if the login happened from a device
previously involved in frauds, to weaken it if the login belongs to a legit device. The probability of
fraud, derived from the combination of the approaches, is obtained through the “Dempster-Shafer”
evidence theory. The major drawback of this approach is that the data collection must happen on
the client side, which makes it cumbersome to deploy in large, real-world scenarios.
Other works that exploit model granularity are [6] and [4] that apply Peer Group Analysis and
Break Point Analysis on spending behavior. Peer Group Analysis detects individual objects that
behave in a way different from objects to which they had previously been similar. On the other
hand, Break Point Analysis operates on the account level. A break point is an observation where
anomalous behavior for a particular account is detected. Such techniques present the disadvantages
of the unsupervised techniques already explained above.
Other two relevant works that can be applied for fraud detection are [28, 33]. In particular, the
PhD thesis by Maruatona[28], presents a background to online banking fraud, focusing on phishing
attacks, followed by a survey of different methods for outlier detection used for intrusion and fraud
detection. The author presents an innovative method for detecting fraud by using prudent analysis,
a technique through which a system can detect when its knowledge is insufficient for a given case.
The PhD thesis by Prayote, instead, presents a background to network traffic anomaly detection
and proposes a method based on a knowledge acquisition approach named Ripple Down Rules.
In essence the author uses Ripple Down Rules to partition a domain, and add new partitions as
new situations are identified. Within each supposedly homogeneous partition the author used
statistical techniques to identify anomalous data that are reasonably robust with small amounts
of data. This critical situation occurs whenever a new partition is added. These methods can be
considered complementary to our approach and can be used in conjunction with it.
Though there has been a good amount of research on fraud analysis, the security of these
systems against evasive and adaptive adversarial attacks seems to us not to have received
much attention in the banking fraud detection context. In particular, all the related works presented
above does not even consider the problem of evasive and “smart” attackers. However, the idea of
“mimicry attacks” [47] is a recurrent concept in the intrusion detection field. Here we report some
of the mostly significant work in the area.
In [47] and in the previous work [46], the “mimicry attack” concept was introduced. They
proposed three methods to avoid detection: (i) modifying system call parameters; (ii) inserting
system calls that are irrelevant to the attack being deployed while minimizing the anomaly rate; and
finally (iii) generating equivalent attacks by replacing the system calls that can easily be identified
by the detector.
[42] showed how attackers can render host-based IDS’s blind to the presence of their attacks.
They presented compelling experimental results to illustrate the risk. They employed four methods
to manually change the behavior of the attack: (i) hiding an attack in the blind spot of the detector;
(ii) modifying an attack so that it looks like a normal behavior; (iii) hiding an attack so it looks
like a less dangerous attack; and (iv) modifying an attack so that it looks like a different attack. In
follow-up work, [43] refined the technique and gave further experimental confirmation of the risk
from such attacks.
Using a categorization scheme, [15] divided anomaly detectors into three categories: black-box
detectors that only make use of the system calls, gray-box detectors that use – in addition to system
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calls – runtime observations, and white-box detectors that also incorporate information from the
source code, which makes it difficult to hide the attacks. They introduced a gray-box model of
system call behavior, called an execution graph and showed the benefits and overheads of changing
gray-box anomaly detector parameters. When used as the model in an anomaly detection system
monitoring system calls, it offers two strong properties: (i) it accepts only system call sequences
that are consistent with the control flow graph of the program; (ii) it is maximal given a set of
training data, meaning that any extensions to the execution graph could permit some intrusions to
go undetected. Experimental results indicated that expanding the model by using more information
would increase the mimicry attack length. In other words, attackers will need more code to hide
their actions.
[24] developed a methodology to evade the detection features of state-of-the-art intrusion
detection systems [9] and reduce the task of the intruder to a traditional mimicry attack. Given a
legitimate sequence of system calls, their technique allows the attacker to execute each system call
in the correct execution context by obtaining and relinquishing the control of the application’s
execution flow through manipulation of code pointers. They have developed a static analysis tool
for Intel x86 binaries that uses symbolic execution to automatically identify instructions that can
be used to redirect control flow and to compute the necessary modifications to the environment
of the process. They used their tool to successfully exploit three vulnerable programs and evade
detection by existing state-of-the-art system call monitors. In addition, they analyzed three real-
world applications to verify the general applicability of their techniques. Defensive mechanisms
against such attacks are presented in [7, 8].
[17] generated mimicry attacks by applying automatic model checking to prove that no reachable
operating system configuration corresponds to the effect of an attack.
[30] proposed a mimicry attack methodology against “powerful system call monitors”, detector
that has full knowledge of the system call parameters as well as their roles in the execution of the
system call. They introduced persistent interposition attack concept where the objective of the
attacker is to modify the read and write system calls to deploy the attack. Their results showed
that although the persistent interposition attacks are not powerful enough to obtain a root shell,
they can evade monitors that monitor system call arguments while achieving goals such as stealing
financial information or impersonating web servers.
[22] emphasized the importance of analyzing not only the exploit but also the preamble of an
attack. In particular, they observed that although the attacker can modify the exploit component
easily, the attacker may not be able to prevent preamble from generating anomalous behavior since
during preamble stage, the attacker does not have full control. Their experiment results showed
that preamble can be a source of anomalies, particularly if it is lengthy and anomalous.
4 OVERVIEW OF BANKSEALER
In this section, we recall Banksealer’s main underlying concept, describing its functionalities insofar
as necessary to understand the granularity and the security analysis against mimicry attacks. We
refer the interested reader to the original paper [11] for additional details about Banksealer.
Banksealer, depicted in Figure 2, characterizes the users of the online banking web application
by means of a local, a global, and a temporal profile, which are built during a training phase,
taking as input a list of transactions. Each type of profile (i.e., local, global, temporal) extracts
different statistical features from the transaction attributes (e.g., average, minimum, maximum,
actual value), according to the type of model built. Once the profiles are built, Banksealer processes
new transactions and ranks them according to their anomaly score and the predicted risk of fraud.
The anomaly score quantifies the statistical likelihood of a transaction being a fraud with respect to
the learned profiles. The risk of fraud prioritizes the transactions combining the anomaly score
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Fig. 2. Banksealer architecture.
with the transaction amount. Banksealer provides the analysts with a ranked list of potentially
fraudulent transactions, along with their anomaly score.
Thanks to the collaboration with domain experts, and after a preliminary analysis of the dataset
(see [11]), we selected relevant attributes. Beyond the common ones (such as Amount, IP address
of the customer, and Timestamp of the transaction), we selected the following attributes:
• CC_ASN: the country from which the customer makes their connection, based on the
Autonomous System.
• UserID: unique ID associated to a user.
• IBAN, IBAN_CC: the identifier of the beneficiary account, and country.
• Card type (i.e., the circuit), and number of the prepaid card.
• Phone operator, and number of the beneficiary of the top-up.
From the actual values of all the attributes listed in Table 1, we extract the features used to
model user’s spending pattern, for a total of more than 12 aggregated features (not counting bin of
histograms as features). In particular:
• From the amount we automatically extract its marginal distribution by means of a histogram.
By doing this we obtain one feature for each bin that corresponds to a range of amount (e.g.,
0-100€, 100-500€). In addition, we aggregate its values and compute the monthly mean and
the standard deviation.
• From the timestamp we automatically extract its marginal distribution by means of a his-
togram. By doing this we obtain one feature for each bin that corresponds to a range of time
(e.g., 0-6, 6-12).
• For categorical features (i.e., IBAN, IBAN_CC, ASN, IP) we count the frequency of each
occurrence and keep a feature for each of these values.
• We aggregate transactions and compute the daily and monthly number of transactions.
4.1 Local Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to characterize each user’s individual spending patterns. It models the
features of the user’s transactions and assigns an anomaly score to each unseen transaction.
Table 1. Attributes for each type of transaction. Attributes in bold are hashed for anonymity needs.
Dataset Attributes
Bank Transfers Amount, CC_ASN, IP, IBAN, IBAN_CC, Timestamp
Phone recharges Amount, CC_ASN, IP, Phone operator, Phone number, Timestamp
Prepaid Cards Amount, Card type, Card number, CC_ASN, IP, Timestamp
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Training and feature extraction. During training, we aggregate the transactions by user and
approximate each feature distribution by a histogram. More precisely, we calculate the empirical
marginal distribution of the features of each user’s transactions. We do not consider correlation
between features to gain lower spatial complexity and better readability of the histograms. This
representation is simple, effective, and, hence, is indeed directly readable by analysts who get a
clear idea of the typical behavior by simply looking at the profile. For categorical attributes (e.g., IP,
CC), we count the occurrences of each category. For numerical attributes (e.g., amount, timestamp)
we adopt a static binning and count how many values falls inside each bin. After this, we estimate
the marginal frequency of the features, computing the relative frequency.
Runtime and Anomaly Score Calculation. At runtime, we calculate the anomaly score of each
new transaction using a modified version of Histogram Based Outlier Score (HBOS) [18] method.
The HBOS computes the probability of a transaction being anomalous, according to the marginal
distribution learned. In particular, it considers the relative frequency of each bin to quantify the
log-likelihood of the transaction to be drawn from the distribution. The HBOS score is computed
as follow:
HBOS(t) =
∑
0<i≤d
log 1
histi (ti ) (1)
where ti is the i-th feature of the transaction t , histi indicates the frequency of the i-th feature.
We improved (1) to account the variance of each feature, by applying amin-max normalization [19,
pp. 71–72] to the frequency of each value. In addition, we add a weighting coefficientwi to each
i-th feature, to allow the analyst to tune the system according to the institution’s priorities. In
conclusion, the anomaly score is computed as follow:
HBOS(t) =
∑
0<i≤d
wi · log 1
f (ti ) ;
∑
0<i≤d
wi = 1 (2)
where f (ti ) is the normalization of histi that corresponds to the formula:
f (ti ) = histi (ti )maxj ∈f eaturei histi (j)
(3)
When a feature value has never occurred during training for a user (i.e., zero frequency within
the local profile), the respective transaction may be assigned a high anomaly score. However, a user
may have just changed his spending habits legitimately, thus causing false positives. To mitigate
this, we calculate the frequency of unseen values as k/1− f , where f is the frequency of that value
in the entire dataset. This method quantifies the “rarity” of a feature value with respect to the
global knowledge. The parameter k is an arbitrarily small, non-zero number.
4.2 Global Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to characterize “classes” of spending patterns, by separating anomalous
users from normal ones. The global profile builds, for each user, a simplified version of the local
profile (see Section 4.1), more suitable to compute the similarity between users. The global profile
is also leveraged to find local profiles for undertrained users. The rationale is that users belonging
to the same cluster exhibit similar spending patterns.
Training and Feature Extraction. During training, we first create a global profile for each user.
Each user is represented as a feature vector of six components: total number of transactions, average
transaction amount, total amount, average time span between subsequent transactions, number of
transactions executed from foreign countries, number of transactions to foreign recipients (bank
transfers dataset only).
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To find classes of users with similar spending patterns, we apply an iterative version of the
Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN), using the Mahalanobis
distance [27] between the vectors.
To mitigate the drawbacks of the classic DBSCAN when applied to skewed and unbalanced
datasets such as ours (i.e., one large cluster and many small clusters), we run 10 iterations for
decreasing values of ε from 10 to 0.2, which is the maximum distance to consider two users as
connected (i.e., density similar). High values of this parameters yield a few large clusters, whereas
low values yield many small clusters. At each iteration, we select the largest cluster and apply
DBSCAN to its points with the next value of ε . The smaller clusters at each iteration are preserved.
We stop the iterations whenever the number of clusters exhibits an abrupt increase (i.e., a knee). In
all our experiments, we empirically observed that this happens at 0.2. As a result, we obtain a set of
clusters, which contain similar user profiles.
Anomaly Score Calculation.We assign to each user global profile an anomaly score, which tells
the analyst how “uncommon” the spending pattern is with respect to other customers. For this, we
compute the unweighted-Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor (CBLOF) [21] score, which considers
small clusters as outliers with respect to large clusters. More precisely, the more a user profile
deviates from the dense cluster of “normal” users, the higher his or her anomaly score will be. The
CBLOF anomaly score is the minimum distance of a user profile from the centroid of the nearest
largest cluster. CBLOF takes only two parameters (α and β), which we evaluated empirically by
considering as “normal” the 90%-percentile of the user profiles. The clustering is re-run according
to the sampling frequency (i.e., 1 month).
4.3 Temporal Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to deal with frauds that exploit the repetition of legitimate-looking
transactions over time (e.g., frequent wire transfers of amounts that not violating the local). We
construct a temporal profile for each user having enough past transactions. It monitors the spending
profile of users, comparing it against profiles learned during the training phase.
Training and Feature Extraction. During training, we aggregate the transactions of each user
over time and calculate the sample mean and variance of the numerical features. For each user,
we extract the following aggregated features: total amount, total and maximum daily number of
transactions. During training, we compute the mean and standard deviation for each feature, and
set a threshold at mean plus standard deviation to classify transactions as anomalous. Undertrained
users are excluded from temporal profiling because occasional transactions have a high variance,
unsuitable for this kind of analysis.
Runtime and Anomaly Score Calculation. At runtime, for each user and according to the
sampling frequency, we calculate the cumulative value for each feature. Then, we compute the
delta between each cumulative value and the respective threshold. Positive deltas are summed up
to form the anomaly score.
4.4 Undertrained and New User Management
An undertrained user is a user that performed a small number of transactions. These users are a
relevant portion of our dataset; thus, we need an effective way to deal with them. For undertrained
users, we consider their global profile and select a cluster of similar users. For each incoming
transaction, our system calculates the anomaly score using the local profile of both the undertrained
user and the k nearest neighbor users (according to the Mahalanobis distance as detailed in
Section 4.2). For new users, we adopt the same strategy. However, given the absence of a global
profile, we consider all the users as neighbors.
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5 GRANULARITY ANALYSIS
A fraud can be performed on a single user, or split it across multiple users (for higher efficiency and
lower accountability). For this reason, anomaly detection approaches for fraudulent behavior can
be roughly divided in user-centric or system-centric depending on the model granularity [5, 12, 32].
5.1 User-centric Approach
According to the user-centric approach, the dataset is modeled by many mutually independent
models that represent different users. As a consequence, an outlier is a transaction that is anomalous
when compared to data belonging to a user.
This low-level modeling approach is effective when the “population” in the data is heterogeneous.
In fact, as shown in the analysis of the dataset presented in [11], this can be true for banking
transaction data where spending behavior between accounts can vary according to amounts
spent. In particular, we noticed a dissimilarity between system-centric vs. user-centric attribute
distributions. When analyzed globally, most of the users tend to behave in a comparable way
(e.g., low amounts are more common than high amount). However, when analyzed locally, some
attributes show a skewed distribution, often with more than one modality. In this context, once
we identify the spending behavior of a particular account, then a transaction is a fraud if it is
anomalous with respect to this account, but not necessarily anomalous to the entire population of
transactions. For example, a transaction of a thousand dollars in an account where, historically, all
transactions have been under a hundred dollars, might be considered as an outlier. However, such
a transaction may not have been considered unusual if it had occurred in a high spending account.
Therefore, this modeling technique may lead up to obtain a high detection rate, since it is able to
discern subtle differences between anomalies and normal transactions belonging to an account.
Unfortunately, the strength of this model may turn into a weakness when it is tightly fitted to data
(i.e., model over-fitting), that, in turn, produces a high false-alarm rate.
5.1.1 User-centric Design. The user-centric approach, implemented by Banksealer (see Section 4),
characterizes the users of the financial institution by means of a local, a global, and a temporal
profile, which are built during a training phase taking as input a list of transactions. Once the
profiles are built, it processes new transactions and ranks them according to their risk of fraud,
computed thanks to the local and temporal profiles.
Training. During training, we aggregate transactions by user and approximate each feature
distribution by a histogram for the local profile and by a set of thresholds at mean plus standard
deviation for the temporal profile.
Runtime. At runtime, following the procedure described in Section 4.1 and 4.3, we compute the
anomaly score of each new transaction using the HBOS [18] method for the local profile and the
delta between each feature’s cumulative value and the respective threshold for the temporal profile.
5.2 System-centric Approach
According to the system-centric approach, the dataset is modeled by a global model, responsible to
represent the entire system. Consequently, in this context a fraud is a transaction anomalous to the
entire data set; for example, a transaction of several thousand dollars would be a global outlier if all
the other transactions in the database were considerably less than that amount.
This modeling approach suggests the existence of a common spending pattern between users.
In fact, as shown in the dataset analysis presented in [11], the majority of users tend to behave
in a similar way from a global point of view. In particular, we observed that some attributes (e.g.
Amount, Timestamp) of the dataset, have a skewed distribution with a high cardinality associated
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(a) PCA of the dataset on two dimensions Users
(b) ROC curve detail.
Fig. 3. Dendrogram representing the hierarchical clustering using the Mahalanobis distance. The different
colors represent the clusters obtained cutting dendrograms at 75% linkage.
to few values. In Figure 3a we show the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on two dimensions
that we have applied to the users’ profiles. As it can be seen, they tend to congregate in one dense
cloud of points, with several outliers points and small groups around it. Figure 3b presents the
dendrogram relative to the application of the hierarchical clustering algorithm. The vertical axis
expresses the linkage (measure of similarity) at which elements are joined: the lower the linkage,
the more similar they are. As it can be seen, there are a lot of elements joined with a high similarity.
These elements compose the large cluster of very similar profiles observed before. Hence, the
majority of users yield densely “connected” areas of the dendrogram. On the other hand, users with
rare spending profiles tend to form small, isolated groups.
This high level modeling approach is designed to represent the global behavior in terms of the
interaction between the users and the system, and, hence, is more resistant to the over-fitting
problem. However, they have a limited ability to adapt to all possible kind of transactions (under-
fitting problem), which may result in both high false alarm rates and low anomaly detection
rates.
Obviously, it is not simple to avoid the over-fitting or under-fitting problems.
5.2.1 System-centric Design. We re-design Banksealer with a system-centric approach paradigms
in mind, profiling all the users’ transactions together to characterize the entire system. In practice,
the system-centric approach applies the local and temporal profiles at the whole dataset without
distinguishing between users.
The system-centric approach does not implement the functionality of the global profile, since it
does not work at user’s granularity (i.e., it does not distinguish between users).
Training.During training, we aggregate all the transactions together and approximate each feature
distribution by a histogram for the local profile and by a set of thresholds at mean plus standard
deviation for the temporal profile.
Runtime. At runtime, following the procedure described in Section 4.1 and 4.3, we compute the
anomaly score of each new transaction using the HBOS [18] method for the local profile and the
delta between each feature’s cumulative value and the respective threshold for the temporal profile.
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6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
As explained in Section 2.2, the goal of a fraud analysis system is to identify unauthorized trans-
actions as quickly as possible, so that banking analyst can take an appropriate action. To evade
detection, fraudsters adapt in response to deployed defensive systems. As a matter of facts, most
of the attacks arise from financial Trojans, malicious software that may someday incorporate
techniques designed to evade popular fraud analysis systems. Therefore, it is not enough to design
a system that can detect attacks that are common at the time the system is deployed. Instead, such
systems should be robust also against potential future threats and evasive attacks.
Though there has been a good amount of research on fraud analysis (see Section 3), the security
of these systems against adversarial and evasive attacks, defined as “mimicry attacks” [46], seems
not to have received much attention in the banking fraud analysis context.
To remedy this shortcoming, we give a systematic study of the issue. In particular, we design
mimicry attacks for the banking context in terms of an operational research problem and evaluate
their power against Banksealer.
6.1 Mimicry Attack Theory and Definition
Mimicry attacks [46] allow sophisticated attackers to cloak their frauds to avoid detection. These
attacks mimic the user behavior during the execution of transactions, but with a malicious intent.
In other words, a successful mimicry attack will be recognized as “normal” by a detection system
and will not raise any alarm. As a consequence, the more a detection system is resistant to a
mimicry attack the more it is difficult and costly for an attacker to deploy an attack such that. The
formalization of this attack is usually easier for signature-based detection systems, since it requires
the attacker to simply generate “new frauds”, not known by the system. However, this is not true
for anomaly detection systems that require a careful examination of their inner working [47].
Therefore, it is necessary to give a formal definition of mimicry attack, suitable for the banking
context and applicable to Banksealer.
Following the methodology presented in [47], we start with a few assumptions that allow to
simplify the analysis.
Since security through obscurity is not a reliable defense and Banksealer has been object of
research publications [10, 11], it is natural to assume that the attacker knows how it works. Even
for a generic fraud analysis system it is unavoidable: if it becomes popular and widely deployed, it
is extremely difficult to prevent the reversing of the system itself by the attacker. As a consequence,
we can assume that the algorithm is known by attackers.
Fraud detection systems rely on a database of users’ “normal behavior”. Therefore, it will require
the attacker to create some approximation of this database. Users’ behavior depends primarily on
the transactions executed during the interaction with the banking system. Moreover, in the light
of the threat scenario presented in Section 2, we can also assume that the attacker can silently
take control and infects the targeted user system without being detected. In general, attacks can
be divided into 1) infection phase, when the attacker infects the target systems with a banking
Trojan (e.g., exploiting a known browser vulnerability, phishing) and 2) exploitation phase, when
the MitB attack, is activated. Therefore, an attacker could readily obtain a useful approximation
of the transactions by collecting data from infected systems. Since Banksealer associate different
models to each user, it will require the attacker time and a lot of effort to acquire enough data to
build an approximation of the models in use. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the
database of normal behaviors is mostly (or entirely) known.
Finally, we assume that the attacker will try to maximize the amount of money stolen, always
under the assumption of remaining undetected. In fact, in this attack malicious transactions are
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executed by the banking Trojan and depends on its persistence in the system: the malware can be
detected on the victim’s system by an anti-virus software or the Command and Control server can
be taken down by authorities.
Giving those assumptions, the attacker can now generate a malicious sequence of fraudulent
transactions trying not to be detected (i.e., avoiding to introduce any noticeable change in the
observable users’ behavior). To do so, the fraudster builds an approximation of the behavioral user’s
model and simulates the detection system. In particular, the attacker generates transactions similar
to the target user’s ones and verify if the malicious sequence is accepted by the detection system
as a normal behavior (e.g., the sequence of malicious transactions must not trigger any detection
system’s thresholds). Note that, checking all these options require a lot of effort for the attacker.
Another challenge from the attacker point of view is represented by the fact that he or she needs
to inject malicious sequences in parallel to the legitimate user’s activity without being noticed in
the short term. This is done by the “automatic transfer functionality” implemented by banking
Trojan: they stop user’s activity (e.g., with a fake error message, unexpected operation’s delay)
while executing the attack.
Under the previous assumptions, the attacker is in possessions of the knowledge about the
Banksealer’s algorithms and models. With this data, the attacker can approximate users’ behavior
and generate fraudulent transactions to trick the anti-fraud framework and silently commit frauds.
However, the job of the fraudster is further complicated by the fact that he or she must observe
the victim for a timespan sufficient to gain enough information to build a significant approximation
of both user’s local and temporal profiles and forge adversary transactions that do not trigger any
alert. In fact, as shown in Section 4, Banksealer computes the anomaly of a transaction using the
HBOS for the local profile (see Section 4.1) and a series of thresholds for the temporal profile (see
Section 4.3).
6.1.1 Mimicry attack Design. We can now formalize the mimicry attack as a problem of op-
erational research. To correctly design this attack, it is necessary to define the variables under
analysis, the objective function, and the constraints to which the problem is subjected.
The goal of the mimicry attack is to generate, for each targeted user, stealthy malicious transac-
tions. As shown in Table 2, a transaction t is characterized by a set of features that depends on the
profile (i.e., local or temporal profile).
The local profile is based on the following categories2 of features:
• Amount
• Timestamp
• IBAN that refers to the IBAN of the malicious recipient (e.g., usually a money mule)
• IP Address and ASN that belongs to the customer target of the attack.
Hence, a transaction t can be expressed as:
t = f (Amount ,Timestamp, IBAN , IP ,ASN ) (4)
However, the variables that an attacker can control to forge adversary transactions are limited
to the Amount and the Timestamp, since the other attributes have predetermined values (i.e. the
IBAN refers to the malicious recipient, the IP Address and the ASN belongs to the victim customer).
Therefore, a transaction t is defined as:
t = f (Amount ,Timestamp) (5)
From the point of view of the risk score, the local profile computes the riskRISK(t) of a transaction
t of being fraudulent by multiplying the anomaly score HBOS(t) with the transaction amount
2For simplicity, in this formalization we are using only the categories of features. For the full list of features see Section 4.
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Amount(t), as shown in Equation 6.
RISK(t) = Amount(t) · HBOS(t) (6)
To remain undetected, the attacker must generate adversary transactions that will produce
a “low” risk score when analyzed (i.e., transactions are placed in the lower part of Banksealer’s
ranking). Hence, the mimicry attack will be subject to the following constraint:
RISK(t) ≤ Tarдet_Risk_Value (7)
where Tarдet_Risk_Value is the value of the risk score RISK(t) in the transaction ranking below
which the attacker wants to hide and to inject fraudulent transactions.
The temporal profile is based on the following features:
• cumulative amount ∑Amount(t)
• number of monthly transactions
• number of daily transactions
As shown in Equation 8, for each feature f , it computes its mean µf and standard deviation σf ,
and sets a threshold Thresholdf at “mean plus the standard deviation” to classify transactions as
anomalous when the threshold is exceeded.
Thresholdf = µf + σf (8)
In the light of the fact that the mimicry attack wants to cloak its frauds, it will hide malicious
transactions below this threshold and, in particular, under the hypothesis of maximizing the amount
of money stolen, in the “delta” between the mean and the standard deviation. In other words, the
mimicry attack will be subject to the following constraints:
0 ≤
∑
Amount(t) ≤ Thresholdamount (9)
0 ≤ number_o f _daily_transactions ≤ ThresholdDailyT ransactions (10)
0 ≤ number_o f _monthly_transactions ≤ ThresholdMonthlyT ransactions (11)
Now, the attacker has all the elements to formalize the mimicry attack against Banksealer as an
optimization problem (see Definition 6.1).
Definition 6.1 (Mimicry attack). Amimicry attack can be defined as the problem of generating a
sequenceM of malicious transactions t expressed in terms of the variablesAmount andTimestamp:
M =
{
t |t = f (Amount ,Timestamp) ∧ t ∈mimicry_transactions} (12)
with the goal of maximizing the objective function:
objective_f unction =
∑
t ∈M
Amount(t) (13)
under the following constraints:
RISK(t ∈ M) ≤ Tarдet_Risk_Value (14)
0 ≤
∑
t ∈M
Amount(t ∈ M) ≤ Thresholdamount (15)
0 ≤ number_o f _daily_mimicry_transactions ≤ ThresholdDailyT ransactions (16)
0 ≤ number_o f _monthly_mimicry_transactions ≤ ThresholdMonthlyT ransactions (17)
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Table 2. Number of transactions and customers for each context.
Dataset Users Transactions
Bank Transfers 92,653 718,927
Phone recharges 29,298 100,688
Prepaid Cards 16,814 71,362
In other word, the mimicry attack aims to maximize the amount of money stolen in time, keeping
into consideration the constraints due to the behavioral models of each user (i.e., the local and the
temporal anomaly score of malicious transactions must be kept low).
To solve our optimization problem, we formalized it with the “AMPL modeling language”3. As
solver we used the “IBM CPLEX solver”4 thakt exploits the well known simplex method to solve
optimization problems.
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION: MODEL GRANULARITY AND SECURITY
ANALYSIS
This experimental evaluation aims to (1) compare the user-centric approach against the system-
centric approach, in terms of detection performance, and (2) to measure the effectiveness of
Banksealer against mimicry attacks.
7.1 Dataset description
The dataset contains transactions from a large national bank, collected between December 2012 and
August 2013. It was anonymized by removing personally identifiable information, and substituting it
with randomly-generated unique values to ensure our analysis could still link values that happened
to be equal. The data contains customer transactions related to Bank transfers (i.e., money
transfers from any account of the bank to any other account), Prepaid cards (i.e., transactions
to top up credit on prepaid cards), Phone Recharges (i.e., transaction to refill prepaid cellphone
accounts). Table 2 summarizes the number of transactions and customers involved.
7.2 Evaluation Approach and Metrics
We split the preprocessed dataset, described in Section 7.1, following the holdout method, using
seven months for building the profiles and the last month, plus synthetic injected transactions
(belonging to fraudulent scenarios or to the mimicry attack), for the detection performance analysis.
Banksealer works by assigning an anomaly score to each transaction (or user) and by ranking
the couple < transaction |user , score > in descending order. Hence, the detection performance is
evaluated from this ranking as support for the bank analyst to extract the top N% of the ranking.
The value of N is chosen according to bank analyst workforce, but from our information, the team
of analysts is able to analyze around 1-5% of transactions (or users).
After training, we randomly select users and inject (blindly to the systems under analysis) N%
synthetically-generated frauds distributed into their transactions belonging to the testing data. Then,
we use the system under analysis to analyze the testing data and to rank transactions (or users). As
said before, to evaluate the detection performance, we consider the top N% transactions (or users)
in the ranking. We perform these operations for each threat scenario described in Section 7.3).
Moreover, we repeat the test 30 times and average the results to avoid statistical artifacts due to
the injection pattern of frauds to random users (i.e., the transactioni ranking is deterministic, but
the the ingjection of frauds is random at each iteration).
3https://www.ampl.com/REFS/amplmod.pdf
4https://www.ibm.com/analytics/data-science/prescriptive-analytics/cplex-optimizer
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Metrics. Under these assumptions and considering the top N% transactions (or users) in the
ranking, a True Positive (TP) is a fraudulent transaction (or defrauded user) correctly ranked as
fraud (defrauded), False Positive (FP) is a legitimate transaction (or user) wrongly ranked as fraud
(defrauded), a False Negative (FN) is a fraudulent transaction (or defrauded user) wrongly ranked
as legitimate, and a True Negative (TN) is a legitimate transaction (or user) correctly ranked as
non- anomalous.
Then, we compute the well-known evaluation metrics of:
• True Positive Rate (TPR) or Recall that computes the percentage of correctly identified frauds
(or defrauded users): TPR = T PT P+FN .• False Positive Rate (FPR) that computes the percentage of legitimate transactions (or users)
that are wrongly identified as fraud: FPR = F PT N+F P .• Accuracy that measures the percentage of transactions correctly classified by the rank-
ing (a fraudulent transaction as fraud and a legitimate transaction as legitimate): ACC =
T N+T P
T N+F P+FN+T P .• Precision that is the proportion of TP over the transactions ranked as frauds: Precision =
T P
T P+F P .• Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) that measures the quality of the detection rate in
terms of the correlation coefficient between the observed and predicted classifications
(ranking); a coefficient of +1 represents a perfect ranking, 0 no better than random pre-
diction and −1 indicates total disagreement between prediction and observation: MCC =
T P ·T N−F P ·FN√
(T P+F P )(T P+FN )(T N+F P )(T N+FN ) .
• F1-score that measures the harmonic mean between the Recall and the Precision: F1score =
2 · Precision ·RecallPrecision+Recall .
The last two metrics are particularly useful in classification problem with unbalanced classes,
like ours.
Finally, we graphically represent Banksealer performances with the Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic (ROC) that express the ratio between the TPR and the FPR.
It is important to highlight that these metrics and evaluation, besides giving an index of the
detection performance, allow us to indirectly evaluate Banksealer from the point of view of the
cost of challenging frauds and amount of funds protected from defrauding attempts. In fact, while
the cost of a FP is the time spent by the analyst in the verification process, the cost of a FN is the
stolen amount and the loss of trust in the financial institution. Hence, a high TPR associated to
a low FPR guarantees that the system under analysis is correctly ranking frauds while reducing
the rate of “false” alarms, which directly impacts the banking analyst activity and the amount of
founds defrauded (i.e., TN). Finally, by limiting the analysis to the top N positions in the ranking,
we are putting a cap on the costs of challenging frauds (i.e., cost of banking experts and systems).
7.3 Model Granularity Analysis: User-centric vs System-centric Experiment
The evaluation and comparison of the system-centric and user-centric approaches is particularly
difficult because no frauds were known or reported at the bank. Therefore, we relied on domain
experts (bank operators) to enrich our testing dataset with generated frauds based on three fraud
scenarios that, based on their experience, well replicate the typical real attacks performed against
banking users.
Fraud Scenarios.We focus on the most important and challenging fraud schemes nowadays, those
driven by banking Trojans (e.g., ZeuS, Citadel):
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Table 3. Amount transferred for each dataset and fraudulent scenario.
Fraud scenario Amount transferred (e)
Bank transfers Phone recharges Prepaid cards
1: Information Stealing 10,000–50,000 250–255 750–1,000
2: Transaction Hijacking 10,000–50,000 250–255 750–1,000
3: Stealthy Fraud
very low amount 50–100 5–10 50–100
low amount 100–500 10–25 100–250
medium amount 500–1,000 25–50 250–500
• Fraud Scenario 1: Info stealing. The Trojan modifies the login form to deceive the victim into
entering a one-time password (OTP) along with the login credentials. This information is
used by the fraudster to execute a transaction (with a high amount) towards his account,
where the victim never sent money to. We test both the case of the connection coming from
a national and foreign IP address. To inject the fraud, we randomly choose a victim from the
testing dataset and used a random timestamp for the transaction.
• Fraud Scenario 2: Transaction Hijacking. The Trojan, not the fraudster, hijacks a legitimate
bank transfer by manipulating the victim’s browser. The challenge is that the connection
comes from the victim’s computer and IP address. Moreover, we execute the fraudulent
transaction within ten minutes from a real one, to emulate a session hijacking.
• Fraud Scenario 3: Stealthy Fraud. The strategy of the fraudster is to execute a series of low-
medium amount transactions, repeated daily for one month during working hours, to better
blend in. We analyze three cases (very low, low and medium daily amounts). We use the same
number of users of the previous scenarios, each performing 30 fraudulent transaction.
• Mixed Fraud Scenarios: Information stealing and Transaction Hijacking. In addition to consid-
ering each scenario independently, we evaluate the proposed solutions with respect to frauds
evenly generated from the first two scenarios to provide a more realistic analysis and to give
an empirical evidence of the feasibility of our approach.
For the bank transfers dataset, the money can be transferred to a national or foreign account,
whereas for the phone recharges and prepaid debit cards the money is charged on an unknown
card. Table 3 shows the features’ values of injected frauds.
7.3.1 Model Granularity Analysis Results.
In this section we present the results of the granularity analysis. In particular, we injected the 1%
of fraudulent transactions. For the evaluation, we considered the top 1% transactions (or users) in
the final ranking from those classified as anomalous. We show the results for the bank transfers
context only for brevity, but similar results were obtained for the other contexts (i.e., prepaid cards
and phone recharges).
The overall results are summarized in Figure 4 and Figure 5. The user-centric approach outper-
forms the system-centric approach in almost all the fraud scenarios under analysis, confirming its
power in the banking fraud detection context.
From the ROC curves presented in Figure 4a and Figure 4a, it can be seen that both approaches
show similar trends in the first part of the curves (i.e., high TPR and low FPR), but diverge progres-
sively as the number of ranked transactions grows, leading the user-centric’s curves to dominate
the system-centric’s ones. While for Scenario 1 the performance of the system-centric and the
user-centric approaches are comparable, since the injected frauds are inherently globally anomalous,
this is not true for Scenario 2 and even more for Scenario 3. In fact, system-centric approach in
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Fig. 4. Model granularity analysis: performance of the user-centric approach varying N, the number of
transactions ranked as fraudulent, and for each of the fraudulent scenarios. The label “UT” means “with
undertrained users”, “L” and “T” refers to the local and temporal profiles, respectively. Labels “1”,“2”,“3”, and
“mix” refers to the fraudulent “scenario 1 - Info stealing”, “scenario 2 - Transaction Hijacking”, “scenario 3 -
Stealthy Fraud”, and “mixed scenario”, respectively.
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Fig. 5. Model granularity analysis: performance of the system-centric approach varying N, the number
of transactions ranked as fraudulent, and for each of the fraudulent scenarios. The label “L” refers to the
local profile. Labels “1”,“2”,“3”, and “mix” refers to the fraudulent “scenario 1 - Info stealing”, “scenario 2 -
Transaction Hijacking”, “scenario 3 - Stealthy Fraud”, and “mixed scenario”, respectively.
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these two scenarios cannot easily distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent transactions due
to their similarity. For these reasons, the system-centric’s curves (and performance) are much lower
the user-centric’s ones. These results are also confirmed by the graph shown in Figure 4b, which
shows the Recall varying the number of transactions ranked as fraudulent.
However, it is interesting to observe that the performances of the system-centric approach
are comparable (except for Scenario 3 where system-centric approach has the worst overall
performances) with the one of the user-centric approach under the influence of undertrained
users. Sometimes, the system-centric approach is even better the user-centric approach, considering
undertrained users. This is easy explainable since system-centric approach does not make distinction
between users and consider the global behavior of users, in a similar way of what the undertraining
management in the user-centric approach does.
The system-centric approach has also a lower overall precision (see Figure 4c) in all scenarios
under analysis. In other terms, frauds are more scattered in the ranking and, hence, it would require
the analyst more time to analyze them.
From Figure 4f) and Figure 5f), it can be observed that both system-centric and user-centric
approach have a positive MCC and, hence, a positive correlation between the observed (i.e., injected
frauds) and predicted classification (i.e., transactions ranked as frauds). Coherently with previous
metrics, system-centric’s MCC is lower the user-centric’s one in all the considered scenarios. These
findings are confirmed by Figure 4e) and 5e) that show the trend of the F-measure varying the
number of transactions ranked as frauds. Consequently, both metrics confirm that user-centric
approach is able to better detect frauds.
Table 4 summarizes the performance comparison between the user-centric approach (for well-
trained users only and with undertrained users) and the system-centric approach, analyzing the
top 1 % of the ranking (see Section 7.2 for further detail on the evaluation approach). In particular,
it confirms the the better detection capabilities of the user-centric approach with respect to the
system-centric.
The results on the information stealing scenario (Scenario 1) are very promising and both the
user-centric and system-centric reach high performance. In fact, while the user-centric approach
reaches a TPR up to 98% with a FPR of 0.01%, a precision of 98%, a F-1 measure of 98%, and a MCC
of 0.98, the system-centric approach reaches a TPR of 97% with a FPR of 0.02, with a precision of
97%, a F-1 measure of 97%, and a MCC of 0.97.
Transaction hijacking frauds (Scenario 2) are particularly challenging, because the malware
does not alter the overall amount of transactions performed but it leverages existing transactions
by diverting them to a different recipient. The IP address is one of those usually used by the user
and, in the case where the recipient fraudulent account is national, these transactions blend in quite
easily. In fact, while the user-centric approach reaches a TPR up to 81% with a FPR of 0.2&, with a
precision of 81%, a F-1 measure of 81%, and a MCC of 0.80, the system-centric approach reaches
a TPR up to 77% with a FPR of 0.2, with a precision of 77%, a F-1 measure of 77%, and a MCC of
0.77. However, in case of national IBAN addresses, both performance drastically drop, especially
for the system-centric approach. In particular, user-centric’s TPR goes down to 45% (FPR=0.5%)
and system-centric’s TPR down to 18%(FPR=0.8%).
Stealthy frauds (Scenario 3) are also challenging: the user-centric and system-centric approaches
perform well when the recipient account is foreign, with a TPR up to 72% with a FPR of 8%, a
precision of 72%, a F-1 measure of 72%, and a MCC of 0.62, for both. When the recipient is national
the performance is halved for the user-centric approach and reduced to a seventh for system-centric
approach.
In general, it can be observed that when frauds contain attribute with foreign value (i.e., different
from national) the system-centric performances are almost equivalent to the user-centric with
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Table 4. Model granularity analysis: user-centric vs system-centric approaches performance comparison
analyzing the top 1 % of the ranking, where “WT” stands for well-trained user only, “UT” for with undertrained
users, “N” for National, “F” for Foreign. Performance metrics considered: True Positive Rate (TPR), False
Positive Rate (FPR), Precision (PRE), Accuracy(ACC), F-measure(F-1), Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC).
Between parenthesis the improvement given by the temporal profiles.
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1: Info. Stealing
IP (F), IBAN (F) 98 96 97 0.01 0.03 0.02 98 96 97 99 99 99 98 96 97 0.98 0.96 0.97
IP (F), IBAN (N) 90 80 85 0.09 0.02 0.2 90 80 85 99 99 99 90 80 85 0.90 0.80 0.85
IP (N), IBAN (F) 98 95 95 0.01 0.05 0.04 98 95 95 99 99 99 98 95 95 0.98 0.95 0.95
IP (N), IBAN (N) 91 79 77 0.09 0.2 0.2 91 79 77 99 99 99 91 79 77 0.90 0.79 77
2: Transaction Hijack.
IBAN (F) 81 69 77 0.2 0.5 0.2 81 69 77 99 99 99 81 69 77 0.80 0.68 0.77
IBAN (N) 45 30 18 0.5 0.7 0.8 45 30 18 99 99 98 45 30 18 0.44 0.29 0.17
3: Stealthy Fraud
v. low amount, IBAN (F) 67(70) 62 65 10(1.1) 11 10 67(70) 62 65 84(98) 83 84 67(70) 62 65 0.54(0.66) 0.51 0.55
low amount, IBAN (F) 65(70) 66 70 10(1) 9.4 9 65(70) 66 70 85(98) 85 87 65(70) 66 70 0.55(0.69) 0.57 0.63
med. amount, IBAN(F) 72(74) 71 72 8(0.9) 8 8 72(74) 71 72 88(98) 88 88 72(74) 71 72 0.64(0.73) 0.64 0.62
v. low amount, IBAN(N) 37(68) 35 7 18(1) 18 26 37(68) 35 7 72(98) 71 59 37(69) 35 7 0.2(0.68) 0.17 -0.2
low amount, IBAN(N) 35(68) 35 10 18(1.1) 18 25 35(68) 35 10 72(98) 72 61 35(68) 35 10 0.17(0.67) 0.17 -0.2
med. amount, IBAN(N) 41(74) 39 17 19(0.9) 17 23 74(41) 39 17 74(98) 73 64 74(41) 39 17 0.24(0.74) 0.22 -0.07
Mixed Frauds
IBAN (N/F), IP (N/F) 81 76 74 0.2 0.2 0.3 81 76 74 99 99 99 81 76 74 0.80 0.76 0.74
IBAN (N), IP (N) 70 65 62 0.3 0.3 0.3 70 65 62 99 99 99 70 65 62 0.7 0.65 0.62
undertrained users. However, in case of more “smart” frauds, system-centric performances decay
rapidly.This can be explained by the fact that the system-centric approach better catches the general
behavior of users that tend to execute transactions from national IP to national IBAN. The accuracy
of both approaches (see Figure 5d and Figure 4d) are similar due to the unbalanced classes problem
that heavily influence its values towards high values.
The overall results in the more general fraudulent scenario (i.e., the mixed frauds scenario),
summarized in Figure 6, are consistent with the ones obtained in [11], with the user-centric approach
outperforming the system-centric and other state-of-the-art approaches and, hence, it is more
suitable for banking fraud detection. For example, [48] detects up to 60–70% of the frauds with
an unreported precision, while in Figure 6 Banksealer’s ROC curves dominates the more general
approaches of the PCA-based outlier analysis [39] and the time-window-based approach [44].
Besides the lower performances, the system-centric approach can be a perfect lightweight
candidate solution for mitigating the undertraining problem. In fact, its performance are comparable
with the user-centric one under the influence of undertrained users.
7.4 Security Analysis: Mimicry-attack Experiment
In this section, we report on experimental evidence the power of mimicry attacks. We show the
results for the bank transfers context only for brevity, but similar results were obtained for the
other contexts (i.e., prepaid cards and phone recharges).
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Fig. 6. Detection performance comparison between user-centric approach, system-centric approach, Sliding-
window-based approach, and Matrix Decomposition-based (or PCA-based) outlier analysis, in the mixed
frauds scenario.
With respect to the evaluation procedure described in Section 7.2, the attacker progressively trains
the system (i.e., builds users’ models) with one month and computes the scoring for the sequent.
By doing this, he or she selects “vulnerable users” (i.e., users that allows a fraudulent injection) and
collects the information necessary for carrying out the mimicry attack: Users’ spending patterns
(e.g., amount, number of transaction executed) and risk scores given by Banksealer. Then, the
attacker automatically generates fraudulent transactions that satisfy the constraints expressed in
Equation (7), Equation (9), Equation (10), Equation (11) to maximize the amount of money stolen in
time (see Section 6).
Mimicry attack Scenarios. We focus on four mimicry attack scenarios that differ in term of
number of transactions injected and “predicted” risk scores associated to each transaction (i.e.,
position in the ranking below which the attacker wants to hide his or hers frauds):
• Scenario 50. The attacker injects only 1% of the generated frauds, aiming at a risk score
equal or below the 50th percentile of the ranking.
• Scenario 50A. The attacker injects all the generated frauds, aiming at a risk score equal or
below the 50th percentile of the ranking.
• Scenario 75: the attacker injects 1% of the generated frauds, aiming at a risk score equal or
below the 75th percentile of the ranking.
• Scenario 75A: the attacker injects all the generated frauds, aiming at a risk score equal or
below the 75th percentile of the ranking.
7.4.1 Security Analysis Results.
In Figure 7, we show the overall performance of Banksealer against the designed mimicry attacks.
As expected, the detection performance are lower with respect to [11]. In fact the performance
curves, if compared with the respective ones in Figure 4, are stretched and have a lower slope in
the first half. This is caused by the mimicry attack that tries to hide injected transactions, making
them look similar to legitimate ones. By doing this, frauds are spread and located by design in
lower positions of the ranking. The slope is even greater when undertrained users are considered,
since they introduce additional noise in the dataset that eases the work of attackers to hide their
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Fig. 7. Security analysis: performance of Banksealer against mimicry attacks, varying N and the number
of transactions ranked as fraudulent. The label “UT” means “with under-trained users”, “L” and “T” refers
to the local and temporal profiles, respectively. Regarding the mimicry fraud scenarios: “A” means that all
fraudulent transactions are injected, 1% otherwise; “50” and “75” mean that frauds injected aim at a risk
score equal or below the 50th and the 75th percentile of the ranking, respectively.
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Table 5. Security analysis: performance (local profile) of Banksealer against mimicry attacks analyzing the
top 1 % and top N % of the ranking. the label “WT” stands forwell-trained user only, “UT” for with under-trained
users. Performance metrics considered: True Positive rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision (PRE),
Accuracy(ACC), F-measure(F-1), Matthews Correlation Coefficient(MCC).
Fraud scenario Correctly ranked frauds
TPR (%) FPR (%) PRE (%) ACC (%) F-1 (%) MCC
WT UT WT UT WT UT WT UT WT UT WT UT
Scenario 50 - 1 % frauds injected
Top 1% ranking 19 5 1.6 1 4 2 98 98 6 2.3 0.08 0.02
Top 5% ranking 100 30 6 5 5 2 94 94 10 3 0.2 0.06
Top 11% ranking - 100 - 11 - 3 - 89 - 6 - 0.16
Top N% ranking 4 3 0.2 0.4 4 2 99 99 4 3 0.03 0.02
Scenario 50A - All frauds injected
Top 1% ranking 4 3 0.2 0.5 82 64 75 77 7 6 0.14 0.01
Top N% ranking 85 70 5.4 9 85 70 92 86 85 70 0.8 0.6
Scenario 75 - 1 % frauds injected
Top 1% ranking 20 8 0.9 1 10 3 98 98 13 4 0.13 0.04
Top 5% ranking 100 43 6 5 8 3 94 95 14 6 0.3 0.11
Top 11% ranking - 100 - 11 - 3 - 89 - 6 - 0.2
Top N% ranking 8 2 0.4 0.4 8 2 99 99 8 2 0.08 0.01
Scenario 75A - All frauds injected
Top 1% ranking 3 3 0.1 0.3 90 77 69 72 6 5 0.1 0.1
Top N% ranking 88 77 5 9 92 77 88 87 88 77 0.8 0.7
tracks. From the point of view of Banksealer’s ranking, this is translated into a greater number of
transaction to be ranked in order to detect all frauds.
In general, the performance shows a comparable trend in all mimicry attack scenarios under
analysis and can be interpreted as the capability of Banksealer to recognize frauds independently
from the attack scenario.
From the ROC presented in Figure 7a, it can be seen that the curves have a smaller area under
the curve and that Banksealer’s ranking is characterized by a greater FPR and lower TPR. The
lower detection rate is even more evident if analyzed in Figure 4b, which shows the Recall varying
the number of transactions ranked as fraudulent.
Scenario 50A and Scenario 75A have an overall higher precision (Figure 7c), F-1 measure
(Figure 7e), and MCC (Figure 7f) with respect to Scenario 50 and Scenario 75, which present low
values for all the presented metrics. In contrast, the last two scenarios have a better Recall. However,
this is simply due to the fact that Scenario 50A and Scenario 75A inject a greater number of
adversarial frauds (e.g., ∼10,000 w.r.t ∼100), which are easier to detect but require a wider range in
the ranking in order to be all detected.
Finally, the temporal profile shows the worst performances from the point of view of all the
evaluation metrics under analysis. This is because three of the four constraints were designed to
hide transactions below its thresholds. In particular, the area under the curve for the temporal
profile is very low, since it can hardly distinguish between frauds and legitimate transactions. This
represents a strong limitation of Banksealer prototype, which needs to be mitigated in future works.
Table 5 summarizes the performance of Banksealer (for well- trained users only and with
undertrained users), analyzing the top N % of the ranking (with N = 1, 5, 11, and % number of
fraud injected).
The results in Scenario 50A and Scenario 75A, analyzing the top N % of the ranking, are very
promising. Banksealer reaches a TPR up to 88% with a FPR around 5%, a precision near to 90%, a
F-1 measure around 80%, and a MCC close to 0.8. In this scenario, undertrained users degrade the
performance by a factor of 15%. Instead, the performance of the same two scenarios drop analyzing
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only the top 1% of the ranking. In fact, Banksealer reaches a TPR up to 5% with a FPR around 0.3%,
a precision near to 80%, a F-1 measure around 6%, and a MCC close to 0.1.
However, as showed by the value of the precision and of FPR, Banksealer is able to mitigate the
mimicry attack pushing up and gathering frauds in the ranking. The very low value of the other
evaluation metrics is due to the number of ranked transactions that is only a small fraction of the
total frauds injected in the dataset.
Scenario 50 and Scenario 75 are particularly challenging, because the attacker injects only the
1% of the fraudulent transaction generated. This means that wants to reduce the chance of being
detected at the cost of stealing a two-order of magnitude lower amount of money. If the top 1% of
the ranking is analyzed, Banksealer reaches a TPR up to 20% with a FPR around 1%, a precision
near to 10%, a F-1 measure around 10%, and a MCC close to 0.1. The performance is even lower
when considering undertrained users.
However, it is important to highlight that Banksealer is able to mitigate the mimicry attack
pushing frauds in the top 5% of the ranking for well-trained users (i.e., all frauds are detected in the
first 3000 ranked transaction) and top 11% (i.e., all frauds are detected in the first 8,000 transactions)
of the ranking considering also undertrained users. This allows to detect at least the majority of
frauds and stop them.
8 DISCUSSION
From the point of view of granularity analysis, the obtained results strictly depend from the data
available. In fact, user-centric approach is feasible when there are enough data to build a well-
trained model for enough users. Otherwise, it will be highly influenced by the noise produced by
under-trained profiles. The system-centric approach can be a perfect lightweight candidate solution
for mitigating under-training problem. In fact, system-centric approach profiles all transactions to-
gether to characterize the entire system. By doing this, it automatically mitigates the under-training
problem, since it directly exploits the global knowledge of the dataset for the computation of the
anomaly score. In addition, system-centric modeling has less computational requirements and offers
more generalization, than the user-centric approach. In fact, the time complexity is linear with
respect to the number of transactions and features. Hence, the decision of what kind of approach
to apply depends on resource availability and the acceptable detection error level.
From the point of view of security analysis, the security against mimicry attacks is a well know
problem in intrusion detection domain [47]. It is important to highlight that, while writing, we are
not aware of banking Trojan variants able to perform such complex techniques of evasion. However,
due to the highly active underground market, evasive techniques will likely be implemented in
financial malware as soon as advanced defensive system, such as Banksealer, will be adopted
enough by financial institutions to justify such an investment. Nevertheless, as anticipated before,
the actual generation of banking Trojan has already techniques to extract sensitive data (e.g.,
financial transactions) from the compromised system. This is a further evidence of the importance
of analyzing the security of fraud detection system in order to make them more robust to this
kind of evasive attacks. Moreover, to develop an attack such the one we developed in Section 6, an
attacker needs to face very high requirements: An attacker needs to know the entire history of a
user and a good estimation of setup parameters. Even if a malware sample could possible recover
part of needed data from history of transactions displayed in web applications, he or she will need
an estimation of parameters setup, which is a much harder task to achieve. In addition, to reduce
the attack surface, the database of normal behavior should be as minimal and precise as possible.
In the light of the experiment presented in Section 7.4.1, we recommend that all future published
works that proposes new fraud detection designs, should include a detailed analysis of the security
against evasive attacks. Even if this type of attacks cannot be completely countered through clever
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design, it seems worthwhile to evaluate carefully the risks. We believe that, our research gives
some specific guidance on how to tackle the fraud detection problem.
Finally, we discuss the effectiveness of mimicry attacks against both approaches. In the system-
centric environment an attacker must compute hindering thresholds once. Then he or she can
freely use such threshold to defraud any user of the system. Instead in the user-centric models,
has a per user (or at least per few- users) set of thresholds. Hence, a detection system based on a
user-centric approach requires more effort to an attacker that wants to “mimicry” users’ behaviors.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we addressed the limitations of [11] by analyzing the problem of the influence of
model granularity on detection performance and making an in-depth security analysis of the
proposed fraud detection system.
From the point of view of granularity analysis, we compared user-centric modeling, which builds
a model for each user, with system-centric modeling, which builds a model for the entire system.
We analyzed advantages and disadvantages of the two modeling strategies from the point of view
of their effectiveness and we showed that user-centric approach has better performances with
respect to the system-centric one in the banking fraud detection context.
From the point of view of security analysis, we evaluated Banksealer against an attacker equipped
with the knowledge of the system and able to perform a mimicry attack that allows him or her
to cloak frauds to avoid detection and to hide a considerable amount of fraudulent transactions
from the top ranking. We showed that Banksealer can mitigate these attacks correctly detecting
evasive frauds with up to 70% of detection rate, pushing frauds in higher positions and making
fraud analysis faster.
Finally, we discussed the dependence between the granularity of the model, the resource avail-
ability, and the acceptable error level. In addition, we highlighted the impact of our security analysis
with an overall final vision on banking frauds detection systems.
The main barrier in this research field is the lack of publicly available, real-world frauds and a
ground truth for validation. Even if data used to train our system came from real dataset, it lacks of
frauds. Indeed, we had, with help of experts to resort to synthetically generated frauds.
It is important to highlight that the research work presented in this paper brings new solid
contributions since, at the best of our knowledge, none of the state-of-the-art works described
in Section 3 addressed this case study analysis. This evaluation methodology, with the proper
adaptations (i.e., re-design for a system-centric approach and mimicry formalization), could be
applied to evaluate other existing fraud detection systems in order to verify their robustness against
evasive attacks and to evaluate the influence of model granularity on detection performance.
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